This post
by Jamie Pleydell-Bouverie addresses the challenge of governance in crisis-torn
Mali. This blog does not reflect the views of the Wikiprogress Africa Network partners.
As Mali
gears up for elections in July amidst the phased French withdrawal that is
currently underway, the next three months seem to be the overriding focus of
policymakers, commentators and stakeholders. This is understandable. Mali is at
a crucial juncture as it tries to consolidate French military success, provide
security, re-establish constitutional order and deal with a plethora of
humanitarian issues. But any sustainable fix to Mali’s multifarious crisis will
have to address its root causes.
Of these,
one of the most important – yet sometimes overlooked – is Mali’s longstanding
history of impunity. In the North, painful memories of unpunished crimes from
previous conflicts have shaped the collective consciousness of people who feel
ostracized and neglected by the central government. Mali is a prime example of
the power that memories of unpunished crimes have to resurface and rekindle
conflict. Stories of massacres that were never investigated in the 1963
rebellion and crimes that were never redressed in the 1990s rebellion have been
passed down to a new generation of fighters (see ICG’s 2012 report Avoiding Escalation). Cyclical conflict will likely
continue in Mali if the cycle of impunity is not broken. It is crucial,
therefore, that there is a meaningful effort to investigate instances of abuse
that have occurred and hold perpetrators accountable.
Since the
onset of Mali’s crisis in October 2011, serious abuses have been committed by
Islamist groups (AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Dine), the MNLA, and Malian forces.
Abuses by Islamist groups include beatings, floggings and arbitrary detentions
against those engaged in behaviour deemed to be “haram” or forbidden. Limb
amputations and executions have been meted out as punishment, unique cultural
and religious heritage has been systematically destroyed, and the
Islamists’ use of child soldiers has been
prolific. The
summary execution of an estimated 70 Malian soldiers in the town of Aguelhoc –
the “single most serious crime of this conflict” according to Human Rights Watch – was reportedly carried out
by Islamists, possibly members of AQIM. Extensive abuses by the MNLA and Arab
militias have also been documented, including pillaging, sexual abuse and the
use of child soldiers.
Countless
abuses by the Malian army have been recorded as well. Following Captain
Sanogo’s coup on March 22 2012, effective command and control of the
security services seriously deteriorated. Numerous instances of torture and
forced disappearances were documented, particularly against “red beret”
soldiers who were allegedly implicated in the counter-coup attempt on April 30.
The execution of 16 Islamic preachers on their way to a religious conference in
Bamako on September 8 is amongst the more shocking abuses carried out by
the military. More recently, retaliatory violence by government troops in the
north has surged.
Bringing
Mali’s well-established culture of impunity to a close will be essential for
the attainment of sustainable peace. It is particularly important that
accountability applies to members of the security forces, including senior
figures such as Captain Sanogo, who has been implicated by some NGOs in torture and enforced disappearances. There are some encouraging signs.
Six soldiers were recently recalled to Bamako from Timbuktu following the
disappearance of several civilians. These soldiers are due to stand before a
Military Tribunal, which will be a first in Mali’s history. But if Mali is to break its cycle
of impunity, this cannot remain an exception to the rule. Accountability
must become the rule.
Any
temptation to consider offering an amnesty for serious crimes in the name of
reconciliation must be avoided. Reconciliation and justice are not antithetical
concepts: Justice is a path to reconciliation. Indeed, the effective work of
Mali’s National Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission – led by Mali’s former
Minister of Defence, Mohamed Salia Sokona – will depend on the administration
of even-handed justice. This, in turn, will require strengthening Mali’s key
institutions – such as the judiciary, the police and army – which have long
failed to be effective guarantors of the rule of law. Mali is in desperate need
of institutions that can provide security and redress, which makes the task of
dismantling Mali’s architecture of impunity more a project of construction than
destruction.
The need
for thinking and acting in multiple time horizons is essential. When countries
are in crisis, policymaking is too often overtaken by events, meaning that
longer term goals get ignored or put on hold. This must not happen in Mali. If
those factors that gave rise to Mali’s crisis – including its deep-seated
culture of impunity – are not addressed, then Mali will still be a sad example
of cyclical conflict in years to come.
Jamie Pleydell-Bouverie,
MA Candidate at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.
This blog first appeared on the Sahel Blog site, here.
Jamie Pleydell-Bouverie,
MA Candidate at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.
This blog first appeared on the Sahel Blog site, here.
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